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Abstract 
This article examines the extent to which national institutional quality affects bilateral 
sectoral trade flows, as well as whether the conditioning role of institutions for trade has 
been waxing or waning with time. Based on a new trade theory framework, we derive a 
sectoral gravity equation, including novel variables corresponding to the exporter’s labour 
competitiveness levels, along with importer’s price indices and sectoral incomes, and 
analyse industry specific bilateral trade flows of 186 countries for the period 1996-2012. We 
address potential endogeneity and econometric drawbacks by means of Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood estimation methods. The results indicate that both the institutional 
conditions at destination and the institutional distance between exporting and importing 
countries are relevant factors for bilateral trade. Moreover, the effect associated to 
institutional conditions at destination moderately increases over time. This is a robust 
outcome across economic sectors, with higher values for agriculture and raw materials than 
for manufacturing and services. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of institutions as a driver of economic development has been attracting 
considerable attention in the literature on long-run economic growth. It has been widely 
acknowledged that local institutional conditions shape growth trajectories in different parts 
of the world (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006). Trade is also 
considered a fundamental driver of economic growth. Yet, our knowledge about how the 
local quality of institutions impinges on trade trends remains limited. It has been claimed 
that good institutional environments facilitate bilateral trade. High institutional quality 
reflects pluralistic and inclusive political institutions that facilitate the existence of a level 
playing field, where individual economic agents cannot abuse market power by 
monopolizing trade in their favour (e.g., tariffs and quotas), and thereby restrict flows as a 
result of rent-seeking activities.  Indeed, institutional quality and smaller gaps in governance 
drive trade flows (De Groot et al., 2004), while weak or inadequate institutions may restrain 
trade in magnitudes which are not dissimilar to those related to the introduction of tariffs 
(Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; François and Manchin, 2013). Specific institutional 
dimensions have also been found to affect trade. Low levels of trust, for example, have 
been associated with lower bilateral trade in the European context (Guiso et al., 2009), 
whereas both an efficient rule of law and a good endowment of informal institutions can 
facilitate trade (Yu et al., 2015).  
In a recent contribution Nunn and Trefler (2014) review the theoretical and empirical 
literature emphasizing the interdependences between trade and institutions, providing 
ample evidence of the impact of international trade on domestic institutions. Trade affects 
institutions in a number of ways; particularly, through the complexity of intermediate 
inputs in relationship-specific investments and the need for contract security (see also 
Nunn, 2007). Their results offer empirical evidence that institutional quality is the single 
most important source of long-run gains from trade. Institutional differences constitute 
also an entry barrier for foreign direct investment (Demir and Hu, 2015) and a good 
institutional framework is a requirement for the positive effect of the foreign direct 
investment channel on economic growth (Jude and Levieuge, 2016).  
From a theoretical perspective, Levchenko (2007) extends the Ricardian model of 
comparative advantage, introducing the effect of institutions. It represents an alternative 
approach to those studies whose underlying models are based on the new trade theory, as 
the one proposed in this study. His results, relying on the set same set of indicators by the 
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World Bank to explain US imports in 1998, show a positive effect of institutions on 
comparative advantage. Blonigen and Piger (2014) review the literature and analyze the 
effect of institutions on foreign direct investment in OECD countries. They use Bayesian 
estimation methods and their results are less conclusive with respect to the effect of 
institutions. Finally, Benáček et al. (2014) find that institutions, social governance and 
political risk are key factors in determining FDI flows, although results differ depending on 
the groups of countries considered. As a result, there is an extensive literature analyzing the 
role of institutions in trade and related flows such as FDI, and from alternative theoretical 
perspectives. 
Despite these contributions, the association between institutions and trade can benefit 
from further study. It has been argued that “defining institutions is notoriously difficult and 
the current literature on the topic does not agree on a common definition” (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2013: 1037). Hence, it is no surprise that Nunn and Trefler (2014: 265) circumvent 
the problem by simply avoiding defining institutions. Measuring institutions across 
different territorial contexts has also proven difficult. In particular, informal institutions –
trust, individual habits, values, group routines and social norms – are more difficult to 
assess and value than formal ones – laws, rules, and organization (Amin, 1999). For this 
reason, in our analysis, we do not rely on a single definition or dimension of institutions 
and consider the whole range of World Governance Indicators elaborated by the World 
Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2010). As with any other institutional measure, these indicators are 
imperfect, but represent the most comprehensive set of variables capturing the quality of 
institutions to date and allow testing the overall robustness of the results. 
Much of review literature is based on the estimation of gravity equations and relies on 
World Bank indicators, as in the case of the present study.1 Nevertheless, we make a 
theoretical contribution based on a new trade theory framework that allows us to analyze 
sectoral trade determinants―for the primary, industrial and service sectors, while relying on 
the most suitable estimation technique associated to the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood estimator. Our database also covers a larger sample of countries and a longer 
period than previous studies. The paper focuses on two key issues: a) whether local 
institutional quality affects the volume of trade by any given country, both at the aggregate 
level and by sectors; and b) from a dynamic perspective, whether the impact of institutions 
                                                          
1 Head and Mayer (2013) offer a chronological overview on the most common and/or efficient methods in 
the empirical estimation of gravity equations. 
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has been waxing or waning with time. In trying to answer these two questions, the paper 
improves our understanding of which institutions matter for sectoral international trade 
both from a theoretical and applied perspective.  
Studying the effects of institutional quality on sectoral trade requires the adoption of a 
theoretical model that can serve as microeconomic foundation for the econometric 
specification. This comes prior to the introduction of government quality indicators as a 
control variable for bilateral trade fostering or hampering trade. For this reason, and based 
on standard new trade theory models, we identify a sectoral gravity equation that we use to 
study the effects of institutional factors on bilateral trade. The specification identifies 
relevant explanatory variables of trade at sectoral level such as labour competitiveness in 
origin (in terms of productivity and wages), along with price indices and sectoral income 
shares at destination. Subsequently, institutional conditions in the countries of origin and 
destination are included in a larger specification of trade costs controlling for distance, 
contiguity (border effect), existence of regional trade agreements and cultural proximity, 
measured in the form of colonial links and the use of a common language. 
From an applied perspective most of the literature analysing the role of institutions on 
trade considers trust indicators by the Eurobarometer, institutional indicators from the 
World Bank, and alternative datasets about institutional quality and governance (De Groot 
et al., 2004; Linders et al., 2005; and François and Manchin, 2013). We go beyond this 
literature and account for all dimensions of institutional quality in the World Bank dataset. 
This means that our dataset is the most comprehensive and representative of sectoral trade 
flows and institutional conditions to date. Institutions are introduced in two different ways: 
1) as a barrier at destination, and 2) as the difference between the institutional indicators of 
the importing and exporting countries, as a measure of institutional distance. On top of the 
institutional indicators, the dataset contains information on trade on tangible goods 
(commodities) as well as services covering 186 countries over the period between 1986 and 
2012. Geographical distances, common border, cultural ties (including language) and 
regional trade agreements are also accounted for, so as to control for additional transport 
costs and trade barriers. The empirical strategy, moreover, follows Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006, 2010, 2015) and François and Manchin (2013) in relying on the Poisson-
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood method (PPML) as the most suitable econometric method. 
The Poisson estimator is consistent and unbiased in presence of heteroscedasticity when 
the data has a large number of zeros.  
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Summing up, the article proposes a structural specification of the gravity equation for 
bilateral trade at the sectoral level, allowing to identify relevant determinants of trade. It 
makes use of suitable econometric techniques based on the PPML estimation method and 
determines the role of institutional quality in world trade making use of a comprehensive 
dataset including a large variety of countries at different stages of development and 
economic specializations across sectors.  
With these aims in mind, the paper unfolds as follows. The next section introduces the 
theoretical model on which the analysis is based. Section 3 dwells on the data used in the 
empirical analysis and its sources. The effects of institutional barriers on sectoral countries 
across the world are estimated in section 4, allowing us to address the questions of whether 
institutions matter for trade and whether, if that is the case, their influence has been waxing 
or waning over time. The analysis also unveils disparities across sectors in the relationship 
between institutional quality and trade patterns. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions. 
2. Model 
We estimate the effect of institutional barriers on trade flows between any two economies i 
and j relying on a theoretically founded specification of the gravity equation based on the 
so-called new trade theory, NTT. The model is characterized by the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman 
assumptions regarding “love-for-variety” preferences, increasing returns to scale 
technologies and iceberg transport costs. Following Barbero et al. (2015), it allows for 
multiple countries and multiple differentiated sectors in trade flows definition (exports and 
imports), thereby extending the different specifications surveyed by Behrens and Ottaviano 
(2009). These authors summarize the NTT analytical framework including the effect of 
transport and non-transport related trade costs for the case of two countries. We extend 
this model and include our independent variable of interest, institutional quality, as yet 
another barrier to sectoral trade, and empirically test if it affects alternative sectors in 
different ways.  
2.1 Sectoral trade framework 
We derive the sectoral gravity equation allowing for a continuum of varieties within 
multiple sectors and countries. The industrial production of these varieties in each country 
is characterized by increasing returns to scale at the firm level, while the structure of the 
industry is that of monopolistic competition, permitting free entry and exit of firms. This 
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prevents the existence of strategic interactions, as well as individual market power, and 
results in an optimal number of viable firms earning normal (zero) profits in equilibrium.  
2.1.1 Consumer preferences and demands 
The preferences of an individual consuming all varieties in economy j are given by: 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = ∏ 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,          (1) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 is the aggregate consumption of the differentiated good in sector s in country j; 
and 0 < 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 < 1 is the income share spent on each sector s by consumers in j.  The 
aggregate consumption of each differentiated good, 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 , corresponds to the following 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) subutility function: 
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = �∑ ∫ 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔)(𝜎𝜎−1) 𝜎𝜎⁄Ω𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 � 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1,      (2) 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔) is the individual consumption of sector s variety 𝜔𝜔 produced in i and 
consumed in j; and 𝛺𝛺𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the set of varieties of sector s produced in i. The parameter σ > 1 
measures the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, as well as the price 
elasticity of demand. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔) denote the price of sector s variety 𝜔𝜔 produced in i and 
consumed in j; and 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 be the wage rate in region j.  
Maximizing the utility (1) subject to the budget constraint―with the wage rate representing 
individuals’ income resulting from labour market clearing: 
∑ ∑ ∫ 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔)𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔Ω𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,       (3) 
yields the following country j's demand for each variety 𝜔𝜔 produced in i: 
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔) = 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝜔𝜔)−𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1−𝜎𝜎 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 ,        (4) 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 is the number of workers/consumers in region j, and 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 is the CES price index 
in sector s and region j, defined as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = �∑ ∫ 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝜔𝜔)1−𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔Ω𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 � 11−𝜎𝜎.       (5) 
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2.1.2 Firms: technology and trade 
Firms operate under increasing returns to scale and technology is assumed to be identical 
across firms within a country. This implies that each firm produces a single variety and that 
they differ only by the variety of goods and services produced and the country where they 
are located in. Since all varieties enter consumer preferences in a symmetric way, we 
supress the variety index 𝜔𝜔 to alleviate notation. Production of any variety involves a fixed 
labour requirement, 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 , and a constant marginal labour requirement, 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠. Trade in the 
differentiated products between countries is hampered by transport and non-transport 
related barriers (trade costs). Trade costs enter the model in the standard “iceberg” form, 
which implies that the cost of each variety from sector s and country i is multiplied by
sijτ ≥1 , resulting in the delivered price at country j. The labour requirement of a firm for 
producing the output in sector s and located in country i is thus given by 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 +
𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 . 
2.1.3 Market equilibrium 
A country i firm producing in sector s maximizes profits: 
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − �𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠.      (6)  
Assuming that markets are characterized by monopolistic competition, with free entry and 
exit, and the absence of strategic interactions, thereby forcing null profits, first-order 
conditions under price competition yield the following equilibrium price as a constant 
mark-up: 
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = � 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1� 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 ,        (7) 
Therefore, bilateral trade flows are obtained aggregating the value of exports of sector s 
from country i to country j for all firms in the sector, 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , as follows: 
𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �� 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1� 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠�1−𝜎𝜎 �𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗�1−𝜎𝜎��𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎−1�𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗�,   (8) 
which represents the specific gravity equation for bilateral trade in the proposed analytical 
framework. The value of sector s export flows from i to j depends inversely on a measure 
of labour competitiveness jointly represented by the marginal factor requirements and 
wages of the exporter region: 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠, rendering country i more competitive as the required 
labour inputs and salaries decrease, thereby reducing mill prices (and vice versa), as well as 
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transport costs 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗. Conversely, they are directly related to the number of firms in the 
sector in the exporting country, 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , the price index 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 of the importing country, and its 
share of income spent in sector s, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 . 
2.2 Econometric specification and PPML estimation 
From the gravity equation in (8) and taking logs, we obtain the following specification: 
ln 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = ln𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝜎𝜎) ln � 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1� + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)ln(𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠) + (1 − 𝜎𝜎) ln 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 +(𝜎𝜎 − 1) ln𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + ln ( 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗)      (9) 
Consequently, considering time period t, and the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) estimation method discussed, the functional form to be estimated corresponds to 
the following econometric specification: 
𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2 ln 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ln(𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
          (10) 
where 𝛽𝛽0 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎) ln � 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1�, 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  represents the individual effects in origin to capture 
country specific characteristics and the unobservable number of firms, 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 are time effects, 
and 𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 is the error term.  
Trade barriers 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 are further specified to consider the institutional factors of interest 
conditioning trade and additional variables related to both transport related costs, proxied 
by physical distance (dist) and geographical contiguity (cont), to control for border effects, 
cultural distance (lang, common language), colonial links (colink), and commercial 
association derived from belonging to the same regional trade agreement (e.g., UE, 
NAFTA, Mercosur, etc.).2  
                                                          
2 We have considered the possibility of introducing tariffs in our regressions, but run into severe problems: i) 
the introduction of tariffs drastically reduces the sample as data are unavailable for many countries, and, when 
present, they are not normally recorded at the sectoral level; i.e., there is no variability across sectors which is 
the aim of our study; ii) the reduction in the sample is aggravated by the fact that there are already many 
observations for which trade is zero; i.e., in those cases in which there is no trade, the value of tariffs is 
missing, although they might exist and be positive, hampering trade to the point that no data are reported. 
This poses the additional difficulty of discriminating between zero and missing data. Dropping observations 
with zero or missing data reduces the sample even further; iii) tariffs correlate highly with regional trade 
agreements and contiguity. However, although we contend that considering tariffs jeopardizes the reliability 
of results given the above drawbacks and precludes the analysis at the sectoral level, we have run equivalent 
regression for trade in tangibles including tariffs. The results, available upon request, show that tariffs exhibit 
the expected negative sign and statistical significance, with a value similar to those of regional trade 
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ln𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 = 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝛼𝛼ln𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝜌𝜌𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠, k= 1…6    (11) 
We propose two alternative specifications for the k institutional barriers, whose only 
difference lies in the definition of the governance indicators of Control of corruption, 
Government effectiveness, Political stability and absence of violence, Rule of law, Regulatory quality, and 
Voice and accountabilitydiscussed in the next section. A first definition considers them in 
levels (l) at the country of destination j, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 , to determine to what extent weak 
institutional quality is capable of holding back import flows. The second one focuses on 
the difference (d) in the quality levels of the importing (destination) and the exporting (origin) 
countries: 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 =𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 − 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 . This represents a measure of institutional distance 
between j and i that does not assume a symmetry of impediments between importing and 
exporting countries―as taking their absolute values would. It captures in a simple way how 
better (if positive) or worse (if negative) is the quality of the institutions in the importing 
country with respect to that of the exporter. 
Following Nunn (2007), we acknowledge that adopting this specification strategy must be 
considered with caution because, while weak institutional quality or high institutional 
distances are capable of holding back import flows, causality may run both ways with trade 
flows influencing governance. This eventually results in the endogeneity of institutional 
measures, which can be dealt with by resorting to the common procedure of lagging their 
values, thereby correcting the possible correlation between these regressors and the error 
term. This is in accordance with the fact that governance quality most likely has a lagged 
effect on trade, although the specific timing of that lag to one year, or earlier periods, is not 
that relevant given the slow changing nature of these indictors―and it should be ultimately 
checked in terms of their statistical significance. Finally, as for the contiguity, common 
language, and colonial links, these dummies take value one when countries i and j share 
common border, language, colonial ties, and regional trade agreements, respectively. 
The estimation is performed using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2010, 2015), accounting for the 
fact that the sample includes a large number of zeros, and obtaining estimators that are 
more efficient than their OLS counterparts. This method identifies and eventually drops 
regressors that may cause the non-existence of the (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimates. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
agreements, which nevertheless lose their statistical significance; i.e., tariffs and regional trade agreements are 
substitute to each other with opposite signs. 
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Therefore, in the case of trade data it presents several advantages given the problems posed 
by the existence of numerous zeros, and the presence of dummies (see also Head and 
Mayer, 2013). In addition, the PPML can solve the bias caused by heteroscedasticity, serial 
correlated error and multicollinearity, because of a high correlation among determinants in 
the structural gravity equation and the country-time dummies. 
3. Data and sources 
The empirical analysis is performed on a comprehensive dataset, constructed from several 
sources. Data on bilateral trade of tangible goods is gathered from the UN Comtrade 
database, whereas that corresponding to services stems from the UN Service Trade. The 
data are available for the periods 1996-2012 and 2000-2012, respectively. This dataset was 
developed by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) and provides bilateral 
statistics among 186 countries for tangibles and 181 in the case of services. Trade data on 
tangibles are further disaggregated into the primary (agriculture and raw materials) and 
industry sectors to test for trade differences between them.  
Country-specific variables correspond to labour competitiveness, sectoral price indices, and 
sectoral Gross Value Added (GVA) in the importing – destination – country j. Current and 
constant GVA by type of economic activity are extracted from UN data. Data on labour 
competiveness depending on productivity and wages is proxied by the GVA per worker of 
the exporting country. This implies that in accordance with the model, the higher the 
labour productivity, the lower the marginal requirements, and while salaries could be 
positively correlated with productivity, we would anticipate that the former effects 
predominates; i.e., a positive coefficient is expected in the regression results. Employment 
is taken from the World Databank elaborated by The World Bank. The sectoral price 
indices are proxied by sectoral GVA deflators using current and constant 2005 values.  
Geographical distances, adjacency, common language and colonial bonds are idiosyncratic 
characteristics that are taken into account for each pair of countries, as they may represent 
relevant enablers/barriers to bilateral trade. Distances between countries, as well as 
information about contiguity, common official language and past colonial ties are obtained 
from the GeoDist database elaborated by Mayer and Zignago (2011). We use geodesic 
distances, calculated by computing the distance between the most populated cities of each 
country. Regional trade agreements data come from de Sousa (2012). 
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We study the role played by institutions in promoting or hindering trade and test whether 
better institutions promote bilateral trade, often counterbalancing the potentially negative 
effects associated with existing trade barriers, such as longer distances, lack of contiguity, 
and cultural differences. The measure of institutional quality at country level stems from 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), elaborated by Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
While not exempt from controversy, the WGI is the most detailed and geographically 
comprehensive array of institutional indicators currently available.3 The WGI provides six 
governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996-2013, capturing different 
aspects of institutional quality at a national level. Our regression variables correspond to 
these indicators measured in differences from the mean, so a zero value indicates that a 
country’s institutional quality is on the average. Therefore a positive (negative) value 
indicates that the observed governance quality is above (below) average. We discuss the 
main elements in the composition of these six indicators in turn: 
• Control of corruption (CC) is a measure of anti-corruption policy; i.e., how a society 
prevents that public power is used by individuals to obtain private gains. It measures, 
among other things, the level of irregular payments, the degree of corruption in 
administrations and companies, and the frequency of corruption in public institutions. 
It is assumed that corruption increases transaction costs and introduces a component 
of uncertainty in economic transactions which will hamper bilateral trade.  
• Government effectiveness (GE) measures the quality and satisfaction of the general public 
with public services, bureaucracy, infrastructure as well as the credibility of 
governments. This measure is a proxy for the ability of a government to deliver 
efficient and effective policies. 
• Political stability and absence of violence (PV) is an indicator of politically motivated violence, 
terrorism, social unrest, armed conflicts. Lower political stability and greater violence 
are expected to be detrimental to trade. 
                                                          
3 The World Bank Global Governance Indicators are composite ratings that combine multiple sources of 
institutional information in order to increase accuracy. A point estimate and a confidence interval is 
computed for each of the six institutional quality indicators assessed. These indicators have, however, two 
main shortcomings: (1) they are only available for a limited period of time, and (2) the individual sources 
combined in the indicator can be influenced by–or reflect–other sources used to compute the composite 
index, as a result of being built on the basis of information provided by panels of country-experts who bear in 
mind their knowledge of the other variables when building the indicators (Williams and Siddique, 2008). 
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• Rule of law (RL) captures confidence in the judicial system, contract enforcement, 
property rights, law enforcement against violent and organized crime, and judicial 
independence. It is a proxy for the overall quality of the legal system.  
• Regulatory quality (RQ) measures the ability of the government to implement policies to 
promote private sector development. It considers the capacity to tackle unfair 
competition practices, the ease of starting a new business, the presence of anti-trust 
policy, financial freedom and tax effectiveness, as well as the presence or absence of 
imposed price controls, excessive protections,… It complements the indicators 
depicting control of corruption and rule of law. 
• Voice and accountability (VA) captures the extent to which citizens are able to participate 
in choosing their government representatives, as well as the existence of civil liberties, 
free press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and human rights. 
Combining all 186 countries for the period 1996-2012, the dataset includes a total of 
178,129 observations of bilateral trade flows of tangible goods. For bilateral trade in 
services the sample size is reduced to 30,724 observations for the period 2000-2012. The 
descriptive statistics for the variables considered in the analysis are presented in Table 1. It 
is interesting to note that, on average, the value for the institutional distance is negative, 
showing that institutional levels of the exporter countries are higher than those of the 
importing countries.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Change Rate 1996-2012 (%) 
      
Trade of tangible goods 
(in millions USD)  505.508 5,367.143 0.000 353,782.656 141% 
 
Distance (in km) 7,237.366 4,447.882 59.617 19,812.043 3% 
 
Labour competitiveness in 
origin (exporter) (in 
thousands USD) 27,442.002 31,908.784 182.435 234,474.469 75% 
 
Sectoral price at destination 
(importer) 1.115 0.344 0.177 2.885 70% 
 
GVA Tangible (importer) (in 
thousands of millions USD) 107.734 371.887 0.005 4,555.146 85% 
 
Institutional indicators in the importing country, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙  
 
Control of corruption 0.038 1.046 -1.924 2.586 -113% 
Government effectiveness 0.064 1.015 -2.450 2.430 -54% 
Political stability -0.067 0.976 -3.324 1.938 0% 
Rule of law -0.008 1.015 -2.669 2.000 -14% 
Regulatory quality 0.065 1.005 -2.675 2.247 -65% 
Voice and accountability -0.048 1.004 -2.284 1.826 26% 
 
Institutional distance as the difference in indicators between imp. and exp. countries, 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑  
 
Control of corruption -0.215 1.518 -4.499 4.096 -25% 
Government Effectiveness -0.281 1.444 -4.697 4.261 -8% 
Political Stability -0.102 1.349 -4.775 4.419 -57% 
Rule of Law -0.229 1.452 -4.621 3.890 -19% 
Regulatory Quality -0.295 1.395 -4.658 4.610 -12% 
Voice and Accountability -0.229 1.376 -3.991 3.664 -25% 
      
 
4. Estimating the effect of institutional barriers on sectoral trade in world countries 
As in the recent literature examining the impact of institutions on trade (Anderson and 
Marcouiller, 2002; De Groot et al., 2004; Linders et al., 2005; Yu et al., 2015), we base our 
analysis on the gravity equation. However, our formulation allows the analysis of bilateral 
sectoral flows relying on a specification derived from the underlying theoretical model and 
using what we consider to be the most complete database that has been gathered for this 
purpose. Consequently, the novelty of the paper resides in the inclusion of new variables 
such as the labour competitiveness measure in origin, along with sectoral prices indices and 
sectoral expending (market size) at destination, as determinants of sectoral trade. These 
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variables can be found in the literature analysing the implications of income inequality on 
trade, for which we provide a rigorous justification and concrete specification (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012).  
4.1 Do institutions matter for trade? 
In a first stage we estimate the gravity model (10) for total tangible commodities, i.e. 
without differentiating between primary and non-primary sectors. All model specifications 
include year and exporter fixed effects to control for their corresponding specific factors, 
such as supply and market capacity, as well as to control for trade policy features of 
exporting countries. Head and Mayer (2013) highlight that importer and exporter fixed 
effects could be used to capture the multilateral resistance terms that emerge from 
theoretical models, as introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003), and Baier and Bergstram (2009). This modelling strategy works best on 
empirical specifications that do not rely on structural models, as it allows dismissing the 
identification of relevant variables and their specific individual effects (i.e., magnitude and 
significance). This is not our case as we base our econometric specification on a model 
including a multilateral resistance term and sectoral income at destination. Therefore, the 
structural variables derived from the theoretical model are considered as relevant factors in 
the estimation. This strategy allows us to identify potentially relevant trade determinants in 
the gravity equation, making sure that the effect of institutional indicators is unbiased. 
The analysis covers both institutional quality levels and differences, as presented in 
equation (11). It controls for geographical distances, common border, language, colonial 
links, and regional trade agreements as determinants of trade costs. As previously 
discussed, the rationale behind these two measures is that better institutional conditions in 
the importing country would guarantee legal security and reduce uncertainty, which could 
be further reinforced the higher the institutional distance between importing and exporting 
country. Given the governance variables considered in the analysis, we hypothesise that 
better institutional quality at destination and a high relative difference in favour (or against) 
the importing country facilitates (hampers) trade. Arguably, what matters for exporters is 
whether the risks at the country of destination related to differences and/or lack of 
familiarity with formal procedures, business practices, norms of behaviour and contract 
enforcemente.g., by sanctioning international agreements– are reduced by worthy 
governance (De Groot et al., 2004; Yu et al., 2015). Traditionally, the majority of bilateral 
trade has taken place between countries with high levels of institutional quality and, 
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therefore, with small differences in their indicators, resulting in a limited effect on trade. 
This is not the case in the present study. The six institutional indicators are highly 
correlated. Nevertheless, we use every indicator individually as each of them measures a 
different facet of the institutional quality of a country. This allows us to test the relative 
robustness of results depending on the specific definition or dimension of institutional 
quality considered. Consequently, we run separate regressions involving each institutional 
variable instead of building a combined indicator capturing overall institutional quality (e.g. 
by factor analysis), whose interpretation in turn would, inevitably, be controversial. 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the analysis for trade in tangible goods according 
to the gravity specification (10). Regarding the economic variables derived from the 
underlying model, results for each separate regression show that the labour competitiveness 
of the exporting country, in the form of lower factor requirements and wages, affects 
bilateral trade in positive ways. Recall that labour competiveness is proxied by the GVA per 
worker of the exporting country. This implies that the higher the labour productivity, the 
lower the marginal requirements, and while the relationship of salaries with productivity at 
firm level is disputed, the positive sign for this coefficient suggests that higher productivity 
results in greater labour competitiveness. The sectoral price index allows to take into 
account the relative position of countries in terms of competitiveness at the destination 
country. The negative coefficients for this variable indicate that inflationary trends of 
import prices reduce bilateral trade.4, 5 The model proposed implies that internal demand 
drives trade flows. This results in a gravity equation including the share of domestic income 
that is spent in the sector at destination, and whose empirical approximation is sectoral 
GVA, representing market size. The results show that it contributes to increase economic 
relations, as expected.  
Next, besides institutional quality, trade barriers depend on distance, sharing borders, 
common language, colonial links, and regional trade agreements. Geographical distance is 
used as an approximation of transport (physical) costs, as defended by Limao and Venables 
(2001), Combes and Lafourcade (2005), and Zofío et al. (2014). Our results confirm that 
geographical distance influence trade flows. Our distance elasticities are around -0.5, which 
is lower than the -0.93 and the -0.91 reported by Disdier and Head (2008) and Head and 
                                                          
4 Indeed, the price index (5) is homogenous of degree (1-σ)2 in prices; therefore, if individual country prices 
increase proportionally the aggregate index increases according to that degree. 
5 Several authors propose different estimation methods when multilateral resistance terms are unobserved 
(e.g., Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Redding and Venables, 2004; Feenstra, 2004; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). 
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Mayer (2013), respectively, but this may be a result of our use of a wider sample, covering a 
larger number of countries over a longer time period. Additionally, Blaney and Neaves 
(2013) offer more conclusive empirical evidence about the declining effect of distance in 
the context of gravity equations, both in cross-section and time-series (panel) estimations. 
Contiguity (border) and cultural proximity represented by common language display very 
similar positive values, with coefficients around 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. With respect to 
colonial bonds, they turn out to be non-significant, probably because their effect tends to 
be captured by common language, a variable with which it correlates when capturing 
cultural ties.6 Regional trade agreements also facilitate trade, with significant coefficients 
above 0.7.  
Focusing now on our variables of interest, we find that all institutional indicators display 
significant coefficients with the expected sign. The strongest connection with bilateral trade 
volumes are exhibited by regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and rule of law. This is in line 
with studies signalling that market competition, legal security, and corruption are some of 
the most serious concerns in economic relations, conditioning economic growth and 
hampering trade. Such is the case of Yu at el. (2015), who remark the importance of 
institutional quality, or Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Jansen and Nordas (2004), 
stressing the role of corruption as a fundamental impediment to trade. In Yu et al (2015), 
considering only the lagged rule of law indicator, these authors obtain a similar positive 
effect on trade, although for a less complete sample of 16 European countries during a 
shorter period of time (1996-2009). Therefore, our results shows the importance of this 
institutional indicator as a trade barrier at destination, and whose robustness is confirmed 
with our current dataset including more countries in different stages of development, and a 
longer period. Also, including two additional indicators at origin and destination―this time 
without lags: Government effectiveness and control of corruption, Jansen and Nordas (2004) also 
validate the importance of institutions at destination. It worth noting that their results 
suggest a larger effect of institutional quality with respect to the usual regressors, except 
when they include transport infrastructure. Hence, they can be considered as substitutes. 
Alternative specifications with different indicators of institutional quality yield analogous 
results. This is the case of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), who consider an import 
demand equation and rely on data on the level of two sets of indicators: Transparency and 
                                                          
6 Tadesse and White (2010) find that cultural distances contribute to reduce trade based on data for US State 
level exports to 75 countries. As in several studies, the inclusion of both common language and colonial links 
are intended to test if both variables are able capture different aspects of cultural proximity on trade. 
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enforceability, compiled by the World Economic Forum (WEF). When compared to this 
literature, our results confirm that improving institutional quality in importing countries 
favours trade, while the intensity of the positive effect depends on the sample selection and 
dissimilarities between economies considered.  
Table 2: The influence of institutions in the importing country on tangible trade 
Tangible 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.191***      
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 ) (5.590)      
Government effectiveness   0.287***     
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )  (7.196)     
Political stability    0.193***    
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )   (5.661)    
Rule of law     0.219***   
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )    (5.659)   
Regulatory quality      0.325***  
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )     (6.828)  
Voice and accountability       0.138*** (𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )      (5.047) 
Distance -0.501*** -0.493*** -0.501*** -0.496*** -0.505*** -0.519*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-8.740) (-8.565) (-8.868) (-8.580) (-8.872) (-9.397) 
Contiguity 0.750*** 0.774*** 0.704*** 0.761*** 0.768*** 0.717*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (4.754) (4.882) (4.553) (4.813) (4.925) (4.805) 
Common language 0.322** 0.299** 0.380*** 0.327** 0.310** 0.387*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.252) (2.121) (2.608) (2.269) (2.231) (2.593) 
Colonial links 0.176 0.171 0.172 0.159 0.141 0.137 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (1.567) (1.525) (1.535) (1.417) (1.266) (1.219) 
Regional trade agreement 0.581*** 0.557*** 0.620*** 0.585*** 0.534*** 0.581*** 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (6.527) (6.256) (7.120) (6.424) (6.032) (6.489) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.629*** 0.618*** 0.639*** 0.633*** 0.628*** 0.635*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (15.58) (15.07) (16.93) (16.95) (16.09) (16.98) 
Tangible price at destination  -0.604*** -0.468*** -0.751*** -0.530*** -0.385*** -0.710*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-5.195) (-4.041) (-6.132) (-4.364) (-3.645) (-5.125) 
GVA tangible at destination 0.778*** 0.757*** 0.800*** 0.770*** 0.762*** 0.795*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (26.93) (25.80) (29.77) (26.65) (26.04) (29.68) 
Constant -3.188*** -3.156*** -3.326*** -3.201*** -3.098*** -3.078*** 
 (-3.755) (-3.688) (-3.885) (-3.782) (-3.652) (-3.745) 
       
Exporter fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 
R-squared 0.753 0.757 0.756 0.756 0.759 0.758 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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The estimation results focusing on the institutional distance between importer and 
exporter, rather than just the level of institutional quality at destination, are presented in 
Table 3. All institutional variables are calculated as the difference between the value of the 
indicator in the country of destination and that of origin. The coefficients are very similar 
to those previously obtained with the indicators in levels at the importing country, 
including those corresponding to the control variables. The variables representing labour 
competitiveness, multilateral price term and market size show the expected signs with 
values similar to the foregoing specification. One more time, bilateral flows are negatively 
affected by distance, while contiguity, common language and regional trade agreements are 
associated with increases in trade. Again, colonial links are non-significant for all 
specifications. 
All six distance governance indicators are statistically significant and positive. As a positive 
(negative) value of the indicator implies that institutional quality in the importing country is 
larger (smaller) than in the exporting country, the positive sign of the coefficients thus 
implies that a larger difference in favour of the importing country fosters trade, while the 
opposite is observed when the exporter country exhibits stronger institutions than its 
partner. Indeed the larger the positive (negative) value of these differences, the larger the 
increase (reduction) in associated trade. These results imply that similar levels of 
institutional quality between the importing and exporting country do not affect trade. A 
greater familiarity with the institutional environment reduces transaction costs and 
increases trade when the importing country has the upper hand, but, if the difference is in 
favour of the exporting country –resulting in a negative coefficient– then trade is negatively 
affected. This result corroborates previous findings by Yu et al. (2015) who postulate that 
when the formal institutions in the importing country are stronger than those of the 
exporting country, exporters rely less on informal ones, promoting bilateral trade. This also 
concurs with the fact that exporters bear the main risk of non-payment of bilateral 
transactions and therefore, the better the institutions in the importing country, the lower 
the risk and uncertainty.  
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Table 3: The influence of institutional distance between exporting and importing countries 
on tangible trade 
Tangible 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.187***      (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 ) (5.623)      
Government effectiveness   0.278***     (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )  (7.198)     
Political stability    0.172***    (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )   (5.399)    
Rule of law     0.216***   (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )    (5.682)   
Regulatory quality      0.311***  (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )     (6.730)  
Voice and accountability       0.136*** (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )      (5.058) 
Distance -0.502*** -0.494*** -0.504*** -0.496*** -0.506*** -0.519*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-8.762) (-8.577) (-9.009) (-8.586) (-8.911) (-9.399) 
Contiguity 0.748*** 0.770*** 0.701*** 0.761*** 0.765*** 0.717*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (4.753) (4.872) (4.581) (4.818) (4.916) (4.807) 
Common language 0.323** 0.301** 0.382*** 0.329** 0.314** 0.387*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.266) (2.142) (2.631) (2.278) (2.261) (2.597) 
Colonial links 0.176 0.172 0.172 0.159 0.142 0.138 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (1.574) (1.534) (1.544) (1.416) (1.275) (1.221) 
Regional trade agreement 0.585*** 0.565*** 0.621*** 0.587*** 0.537*** 0.582*** 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (6.577) (6.352) (7.193) (6.457) (6.078) (6.498) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.634*** 0.653*** 0.641*** 0.640*** 0.647*** 0.628*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (16.22) (16.85) (17.08) (17.55) (16.83) (17.21) 
Tangible price at destination  -0.612*** -0.481*** -0.781*** -0.536*** -0.415*** -0.712*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-5.278) (-4.155) (-6.386) (-4.466) (-3.965) (-5.156) 
GVA tangible at destination 0.778*** 0.759*** 0.801*** 0.771*** 0.763*** 0.795*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (27.07) (25.95) (29.77) (26.72) (26.13) (29.69) 
Constant -3.502*** -3.826*** -3.723*** -3.696*** -3.725*** -3.209*** 
 (-4.131) (-4.417) (-4.395) (-4.343) (-4.336) (-3.913) 
       
Exporter fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 
R-squared 0.752 0.755 0.757 0.756 0.758 0.757 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
 
Finally, in light of the similarity in the coefficients between institutional levels and 
differences–which is also consistent for all sectors, as reported in the following sections–it 
can be argued that the variable defined as the difference in institutional levels  𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑  
represents mostly a translation of institutional quality at destination 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 . The change 
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from levels to distance fundamentally affects the intercepts and individual fixed effects, but 
not the value of the coefficients, when normally changes in scale, such as measurement 
units, alter the coefficients but not the intercepts. A result that is confirmed by the high 
pairwise correlation between the institutional variables in levels and differences, whose 
value is around 0.75. 
 
4.2 Change in the impact of geographical distance and institutional barriers  
A second research question of the study refers to whether the role of institutional quality 
for trade has been increasing over time. We address it by examining the stability of the 
coefficients associated to both geographical and institutional distance by means of 
interacting the institutional indicators with time dummies. In this way we can compute the 
marginal effects of the institutional variables for every year. This type of analysis can be 
then transformed into annual figures, facilitating the visual inspection of the association 
between each variable and trade over time.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the coefficients estimating the association of geographical 
distance with bilateral trade. The outcome is a relatively stable relationship between both 
factors over time. A negligible decline in the effect of distance in the first decade of the 21st 
century is observed. However, the results of the analysis point to a strong persistence of a 
negative impact of geographical distance on trade, as reported in the literature (e.g., Blaney 
and Neaves, 2013; Disdier and Head, 2008). Explanations for the persistent effect of this 
type of distance can be found in the composition of trade. In a large number of countries, 
trade is dominated by industries where geographical distance still heavily determines costs.7 
It may also be the case, as hypothesized by Duranton and Storper (2008), that greater trade 
in more sophisticated goods with higher transaction costs may offset the effects of a 
decline in transport costs.  
 
  
                                                          
7 Chaney (2013) assesses the theoretical effect of distance from the perspective of the emergence of stable 
network of input-output linkages between firms. He shows that if the distribution of firm sizes is well 
approximated by Zipf's law and larger firms export over longer distances on average, then aggregate trade is 
inversely proportional to distance.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of the impact of geographical distance 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the coefficients of institutional quality at destination and 
Figure 3 displays the values of those corresponding to the institutional distance between 
importer and exporter. Given rising trade levels, a growing connection between 
institutional quality and bilateral trade over time can be expected. The results, indeed, show 
this trend for most indicators of institutional quality at destination. The graphs in Figure 2 
display an upward sloping trend throughout the period. In spite of some decline in the 
dimension of the coefficients in the last years, the overall trajectory indicates a larger 
relevance of institutional factors at destination, at least until the outbreak of the crisis. The 
increasing role of institutional distance takes place even in the face of the commodity boom 
of the 2000s, which facilitated trade in raw materials, badly needed for industrial 
production in emerging and developed and emerging countries alike and often sourced 
from countries with weaker institutionsas confirmed in the following section. The revival 
of the role of institutions is observed throughout the whole period, reflecting the rapid rise 
of new players in trade, such as China,  that despite starting from a relatively low level of 
institutional quality, have made considerable progress over recent years. The fact that 
importing countries have also frequently adopted a realpolitik attitude towards trade in 
energy sources and raw materials – which has at times implied turning a blind eye on 
exporting countries’ internal affairs and on local labour rights – has not prevented 
institutions from gradually playing a more important role in determining trade flows. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the increasing influence of institutional quality takes place 
during a period when the institutional quality has tended to decline (with the exception of 
the realm of voice and accountability) (Table 1), particularly in regions of the world that were 
relatively open to trade in previous years and which have witnessed an increase in trade 
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flows. The greatest increase in the role of the institutions of the importing country for 
trade concern government effectiveness and political stability, whose coefficients increase from 
0.23 and 0.14 in 1999 to 0.32 and 0.22 in 2012, respectively. At the opposite end, the 
connection between regulatory quality and trade barely changed during the period of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
As for institutional distance between the importing and exporting country, the positive 
coefficients of Figure 3 imply that countries with better institutions enjoy the upper hand 
in trade – as the higher positive (negative) value of the indicator, the larger the institutional 
distance in favour of the importing (exporting) country. More bilateral trade takes place 
when the importing country has stronger institutions. Weaker institutions in the importing 
country – or, symmetrically, stronger institutions in the exporting country – result in lower 
bilateral trade volumes. Most institutional distance coefficients displayed in Table 3 adopt a 
moderately inverted U-shaped curve, with the upward trend often reverting from around 
2005. Over the whole period of analysis, the influence of institutional distance on trade 
remains non-linear, but mostly neutral. This non-linearity and neutrality is particularly 
pronounced for control of corruption, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability.  
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Figure 2: Evolution of the impact of institutions in the importing country. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the impact of institutional distance indicators between exporting 
and importing countries 
 
  
  
  
  
25 
 
4.3 Sector sensitivity to institutions 
To account for the sectoral dimension of trade, and assess the robustness of previous 
results, we further perform a series of equivalent regressions considering the primary, 
industry and service sectors, and compare the new results with those reported for overall 
trade. Sector-specific results are compared to the aggregate trade benchmark (Tables 2 and 
3). For each sector we systematically compare the variables corresponding to: a) the 
theoretical model determinants: labour competitiveness (productivity) of the exporting 
country and the price index and market size, both in the importing country; b) the control 
variables – distance, contiguity, cultural ties and regional trade agreements; and, finally, c) 
the institutional quality indicators. For each pairwise comparison we highlight the most 
relevant differences and commonalities across sectors.  
Tables 4 and 5 show the results estimating the gravity equation (10) for trade in the primary 
sector (agriculture and natural resources), including trade barriers in levels and differences, 
respectively (eq. 11). The different variables in the gravity equation present the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. Regarding the trade determinants, labour 
competiveness plays a lesser role in the primary sector than on average for all tangible 
goods (Table 2). Indeed, the estimated coefficients are about half those previously 
estimated (about 0.3 vs. 0.6). Given the level of agricultural mechanization and its lower 
cost share in production, labour does not drive export competitiveness to the same extent 
as in other tangibles, particularly manufacturing (Tables 6 and 7). The values are also about 
one fourth lower than those observed for services. The results for the effects of the 
sectoral price index and market size at destination do not change with respect to the 
benchmark, regardless the institutional indicator considered. Sectoral price index, in 
particular, presents a large variability depending on the institutional factor considered (-
0.278 for rule of law and -0.585 for voice and accountability).  
As for trade controls, distance plays a larger negative role for trade. The border effect 
represented by contiguity does not change, and the significance of the two variables 
capturing cultural ties changes: colonial links become significant, while common language 
turns insignificant. These results substantiate those of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), 
who convey that common language and colonial links are significant and non-significant 
for trade, respectively. Contiguity or border effects and trade agreements remain 
significant.  
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Finally, the influence of institutional quality at destination on trade in agricultural goods 
and natural resources greatly differs from the aggregate benchmark. The quality of 
institutions leads to greater increases in trade in the primary sector than for the benchmark 
as well as for manufacturing and services. Given the importance of institutions for bilateral 
trade in this sector, the results justify proposals such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) that, from 2003 onwards, has promoted a more open and 
accountable management of extractive resources, addressing relevant governance issues in 
the oil, gas and mining sector. This initiative has already been adopted by 51 countries.  
Our results indicate that the more successful this initiative becomes in increasing 
governance quality, the larger the potential benefit terms of increases in trade. Indeed, the 
coefficients of the institutional indicators display similar values to those of regional trade 
agreements, which is a remarkable result giving the importance of the latter in gravity 
studies. Economic integration, thus, seems to go hand by hand with institutional 
harmonization (e.g., the previously mentioned EITI). To the extent that regional trade 
agreements lower trade barriers as tariffs increases them, our results complement those of 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and François and Manchin (2013). Hence, recent 
increases in protectionism – such as the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, imposing new tariffs and demanding a renegotiation of NAFTA or the Brexit 
process – can only be compensated by significant increases in institutional quality, 
particularly, in regulatory quality and government effectiveness, which exhibit the greatest effects.  
Voice and accountability is by contrast the least relevant.       
Table 5 qualifies the previous results by considering institutional distance. Changes in the 
coefficients are marginal for tangibles:  only labour competiveness adopts higher values 
than the benchmark. The values increase by one third larger with respect to the regressions 
considering institutional levels at destination. The values of the constant and the fixed 
effects also differ between both institutional specifications in levels and differences.  
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Table 4: The influence of institutions in the importing country on primary trade 
Agriculture and natural resources 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.442***      
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 ) (12.43)      
Government effectiveness   0.546***     
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )  (13.96)     
Political stability    0.476***    
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )   (8.875)    
Rule of law     0.496***   
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )    (11.36)   
Regulatory quality      0.556***  
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )     (13.70)  
Voice and accountability       0.329*** (𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )      (7.105) 
Distance -0.746*** -0.752*** -0.783*** -0.743*** -0.766*** -0.794*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-10.19) (-10.58) (-10.88) (-9.880) (-11.11) (-12.15) 
Contiguity 0.549*** 0.571*** 0.428** 0.579*** 0.559*** 0.462*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.848) (3.056) (2.198) (2.940) (3.148) (2.623) 
Common language -0.214 -0.206 -0.0787 -0.194 -0.183 -0.123 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-1.238) (-1.233) (-0.488) (-1.108) (-1.114) (-0.782) 
Colonial links 0.620*** 0.590*** 0.690*** 0.577*** 0.541*** 0.572*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (3.482) (3.274) (4.234) (3.209) (3.038) (3.247) 
Regional trade agreement 0.309*** 0.260** 0.346*** 0.297** 0.241** 0.322*** 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (2.711) (2.349) (3.196) (2.455) (2.289) (3.303) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.291*** 0.270*** 0.323*** 0.293*** 0.280*** 0.314*** 
origin (exporter) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (3.392) (3.187) (3.955) (3.734) (3.425) (3.801) 
Agricult. price at destination  -0.412*** -0.373*** -0.677*** -0.278* -0.285** -0.585*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-2.846) (-2.688) (-4.827) (-1.844) (-2.027) (-4.927) 
GVA Agricult. at destination 0.728*** 0.692*** 0.781*** 0.711*** 0.713*** 0.764*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (20.50) (20.11) (24.23) (20.30) (20.14) (20.24) 
Constant 2.390** 2.569** 2.559** 2.389** 2.595*** 2.698*** 
 (2.374) (2.568) (2.556) (2.468) (2.707) (2.987) 
       
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 
R-squared 0.570 0.582 0.583 0.570 0.586 0.581 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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Table 5: The influence of institutional distance between exporting and importing countries 
on primary trade 
Agriculture and natural resources 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.435***      (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 ) (12.49)      
Government effectiveness   0.538***     (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )  (14.06)     
Political stability    0.426***    (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )   (8.825)    
Rule of law     0.489***   (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )    (11.32)   
Regulatory quality      0.545***  (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )     (13.84)  
Voice and accountability       0.321*** (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )      (7.111) 
Distance -0.748*** -0.753*** -0.791*** -0.744*** -0.766*** -0.796*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-10.25) (-10.61) (-11.20) (-9.932) (-11.15) (-12.19) 
Contiguity 0.545*** 0.565*** 0.421** 0.577*** 0.556*** 0.460*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.837) (3.031) (2.200) (2.939) (3.135) (2.616) 
Common language -0.211 -0.205 -0.0753 -0.191 -0.180 -0.122 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-1.231) (-1.226) (-0.476) (-1.096) (-1.100) (-0.774) 
Colonial links 0.621*** 0.591*** 0.687*** 0.577*** 0.543*** 0.574*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (3.511) (3.298) (4.220) (3.208) (3.062) (3.269) 
Regional trade agreement 0.311*** 0.269** 0.351*** 0.296** 0.247** 0.323*** 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (2.739) (2.446) (3.324) (2.456) (2.363) (3.318) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.378*** 0.408*** 0.374*** 0.367*** 0.435*** 0.349*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (4.151) (4.867) (4.207) (4.450) (4.944) (4.005) 
Agricult. price at destination  -0.420*** -0.369*** -0.709*** -0.296** -0.311** -0.594*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-2.907) (-2.662) (-5.058) (-1.980) (-2.215) (-4.988) 
GVA Agricult. at destination 0.729*** 0.693*** 0.777*** 0.711*** 0.713*** 0.764*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (20.57) (20.19) (24.27) (20.30) (20.20) (20.31) 
Constant 1.142 0.844 1.265 0.917 0.687 2.029** 
 (1.088) (0.857) (1.243) (0.941) (0.691) (2.148) 
       
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 
R-squared 0.567 0.581 0.583 0.571 0.585 0.581 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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Tables 6 and 7 present the regressions for bilateral trade in the industry sector. In this case – 
and as expected – labour export competitiveness plays a larger role in explaining trade, 
increasing the aggregate value for tangibles from 0.3 to 0.6, with respect to those reported 
for the primary sector. The industry price at destination also exhibits a larger value, while 
market size remains virtually unchanged. The control variables capturing the border effect 
(0.7) and regional trade agreements (0.6) show larger effects than for the primary sector. 
Each of these variables compensates for the negative effect of distance (-0.5). Finally, the 
effect of institutional quality is much lower, with values in the range between, 0.102 for voice 
and accountability, and 0.271, for regulatory quality – for agriculture the range was between 
0.329 and 0.556. As suggested by Yu et al. (2015), these results may be a consequence of 
the fact that in the context of trade in differentiated or heterogeneous goods, such as 
manufactures or services, importers bear a considerable part of the risk of non-payment in 
bilateral trade transactions. Under these circumstances, informal institutions, such as trust, 
are more important for trade in heterogeneous goods for which quality may be non-
contractable and is also less visible for courts (Guiso et al., 2009). 
From the above results it can also be concluded that the ranking of indicators across 
sectors is stable, and while better institutional quality in the importing country always 
facilitates bilateral trade, voice and accountability, followed by control of corruption, have the 
lowest impact.  The industrial sector follows then agriculture and natural resources, 
indicating that improving institutional quality would facilitate trade. Hence, developing and 
emerging countries, where these two sectors make up the largest share of exports, will 
benefit from undertaking further institutional reforms aimed at improving the quality of 
local institutions (Méon and Sekkat, 2008). The results considering institutional distance 
are, once again, very similar and further corroborate the views above. 
  
30 
 
Table 6: The influence of institutions in the importing country on industry trade 
Industry 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.149***      
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 ) (4.219)      
Government effectiveness   0.235***     
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )  (5.674)     
Political stability    0.133***    
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )   (3.866)    
Rule of law     0.170***   
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )    (4.330)   
Regulatory quality      0.271***  
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )     (5.475)  
Voice and accountability       0.102*** (𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )      (3.662) 
Distance -0.484*** -0.477*** -0.486*** -0.480*** -0.487*** -0.499*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-8.418) (-8.219) (-8.632) (-8.278) (-8.456) (-8.971) 
Contiguity 0.770*** 0.792*** 0.730*** 0.778*** 0.788*** 0.741*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (4.839) (4.946) (4.714) (4.885) (4.982) (4.885) 
Common language 0.354** 0.331** 0.402*** 0.359** 0.340** 0.409*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.517) (2.375) (2.794) (2.526) (2.469) (2.769) 
Colonial links 0.148 0.144 0.145 0.135 0.119 0.118 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (1.312) (1.281) (1.290) (1.193) (1.055) (1.040) 
Regional trade agreement 0.592*** 0.570*** 0.623*** 0.596*** 0.550*** 0.592*** 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (6.665) (6.394) (7.149) (6.598) (6.187) (6.602) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.653*** 0.644*** 0.661*** 0.656*** 0.652*** 0.658*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (16.34) (15.84) (17.22) (17.38) (16.90) (17.46) 
Industry price at destination  -0.609*** -0.485*** -0.731*** -0.554*** -0.423*** -0.692*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-5.543) (-4.406) (-6.286) (-4.962) (-4.169) (-5.285) 
GVA Industry at destination 0.762*** 0.745*** 0.780*** 0.756*** 0.747*** 0.775*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (26.40) (25.37) (29.04) (26.24) (25.51) (29.34) 
Constant -4.011*** -3.989*** -4.104*** -4.025*** -3.937*** -3.923*** 
 (-4.125) (-4.082) (-4.211) (-4.146) (-4.050) (-4.104) 
       
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 
R-squared 0.754 0.756 0.759 0.757 0.759 0.758 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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Table 7: The influence of institutional distance between exporting and importing countries 
on industry trade 
Industry 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.146***      (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 ) (4.268)      
Government effectiveness   0.228***     (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )  (5.671)     
Political stability    0.118***    (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )   (3.675)    
Rule of law     0.168***   (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )    (4.349)   
Regulatory quality      0.259***  (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )     (5.387)  
Voice and accountability       0.102*** (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )      (3.686) 
Distance -0.485*** -0.477*** -0.489*** -0.480*** -0.488*** -0.499*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-8.430) (-8.229) (-8.740) (-8.281) (-8.492) (-8.968) 
Contiguity 0.768*** 0.788*** 0.728*** 0.777*** 0.785*** 0.741*** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (4.839) (4.939) (4.734) (4.887) (4.974) (4.886) 
Common language 0.355** 0.334** 0.404*** 0.360** 0.344** 0.409*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.525) (2.394) (2.812) (2.534) (2.495) (2.771) 
Colonial links 0.148 0.145 0.145 0.134 0.119 0.118 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (1.316) (1.287) (1.297) (1.192) (1.062) (1.040) 
Regional trade agreement 0.595*** 0.577*** 0.623*** 0.597*** 0.552*** 0.593*** 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (6.698) (6.471) (7.197) (6.624) (6.223) (6.605) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.655*** 0.671*** 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.665*** 0.652*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (16.94) (17.45) (17.33) (17.87) (17.55) (17.71) 
Industry price at destination  -0.613*** -0.495*** -0.752*** -0.559*** -0.446*** -0.692*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-5.590) (-4.505) (-6.446) (-5.048) (-4.426) (-5.304) 
GVA Industry at destination 0.763*** 0.747*** 0.781*** 0.757*** 0.748*** 0.776*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (26.54) (25.53) (29.07) (26.31) (25.60) (29.35) 
Constant -4.248*** -4.530*** -4.370*** -4.403*** -4.442*** -4.017*** 
 (-4.367) (-4.583) (-4.500) (-4.502) (-4.518) (-4.208) 
       
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 178,129 
R-squared 0.754 0.755 0.759 0.757 0.758 0.758 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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Restricted data availability for trade in services drastically reduces the sample to 30,661 
observations over the period between 2000 and 2012. These changes, along with the 
different nature of trade in services, result in important variations in the estimates reported 
in Tables 8 and 9, relative to trade in the primary and manufacturing sectors. These 
changes mainly affect the control variables, with a reversal in significance for the highly 
interrelated contiguity and regional trade agreements, whose values lose statistical 
significant in all regressions. These results confirm recent studies arguing that trade in 
services is not as dependent on vicinity as trade in tangibles. And while service production 
requires the agreement, co-operation and active participation of consumers (Hill, 1999) as 
well as a close interaction between exporters and importers, this “proximity burden” is not 
as physical as it may seem. Physical distance for trade in services can be compensated by a 
greater use of information and telecommunication technologies that characterize the digital 
age. Nevertheless, distance and common language still exhibit relevant and significant 
coefficients, rejecting the “end of distance” and “cultural proximity irrelevance” hypotheses 
(e.g. Tadesse and White, 2010).  
Some controls, however, remain relevant. Labour competitiveness, sectoral price and 
market share shape trade in services in a similar way to trade in tangibles. The results in 
Tables 8 and 9 also show that institutional quality is a relevant factor for trade in services. 
Here, the ranking of indicators mirrors those already discussed, although the coefficient for 
voice and accountability becomes negligible and loses, for the first time, statistical significance.  
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Table 8: The influence of institutions in the importing country on services trade 
Services 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.186***      
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 ) (4.288)      
Government effectiveness   0.223***     
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )  (4.037)     
Political stability    0.200***    
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )   (4.181)    
Rule of law     0.201***   
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )    (3.704)   
Regulatory quality      0.287***  
(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )     (4.710)  
Voice and accountability       0.0524 (𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑙𝑙 )      (1.079) 
Distance -0.456*** -0.461*** -0.465*** -0.453*** -0.457*** -0.491*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-8.101) (-8.184) (-8.140) (-8.007) (-8.271) (-9.565) 
Contiguity 0.143 0.139 0.0593 0.152 0.174 0.0735 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (0.805) (0.795) (0.332) (0.852) (1.025) (0.467) 
Common language 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.472*** 0.414*** 0.392*** 0.489*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.903) (2.909) (3.431) (2.966) (2.827) (3.588) 
Colonial links 0.375*** 0.369** 0.401*** 0.360** 0.340** 0.342** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.622) (2.536) (2.877) (2.486) (2.371) (2.346) 
Regional trade agreement 0.185 0.178 0.233* 0.190 0.144 0.196 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (1.483) (1.444) (1.956) (1.500) (1.139) (1.582) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.395*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.387*** 0.391*** 0.386*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (5.468) (5.207) (5.091) (5.358) (5.392) (5.261) 
Services price at destination  -0.367* -0.350* -0.454** -0.312 -0.226 -0.600*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-1.772) (-1.655) (-2.276) (-1.447) (-1.135) (-3.520) 
GVA Services at destination 0.682*** 0.677*** 0.708*** 0.676*** 0.670*** 0.706*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (27.66) (26.95) (31.61) (26.69) (26.11) (29.04) 
Constant -1.122 -0.998 -1.036 -1.003 -1.059 -0.826 
 (-1.152) (-1.017) (-1.087) (-1.026) (-1.096) (-0.894) 
       
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,724 30,724 30,724 30,724 30,724 30,724 
R-squared 0.777 0.779 0.783 0.778 0.781 0.788 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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Table 9: The influence of institutional distance between exporting and importing countries 
on services trade 
Services 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control of corruption   0.177***      (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 ) (4.274)      
Government effectiveness   0.209***     (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )  (3.997)     
Political stability    0.176***    (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )   (3.996)    
Rule of law     0.197***   (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )    (3.686)   
Regulatory quality      0.276***  (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )     (4.732)  
Voice and accountability       0.0517 (𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠−1𝑑𝑑 )      (1.076) 
Distance -0.458*** -0.463*** -0.469*** -0.454*** -0.458*** -0.491*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (-8.191) (-8.235) (-8.276) (-8.032) (-8.328) (-9.568) 
Contiguity 0.139 0.133 0.0581 0.150 0.170 0.0733 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (0.788) (0.767) (0.331) (0.843) (1.004) (0.466) 
Common language 0.412*** 0.413*** 0.476*** 0.416*** 0.396*** 0.489*** 
(𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.955) (2.954) (3.463) (2.981) (2.867) (3.593) 
Colonial links 0.374*** 0.368** 0.394*** 0.359** 0.340** 0.342** 
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) (2.619) (2.536) (2.812) (2.485) (2.374) (2.346) 
Regional trade agreement 0.186 0.182 0.232* 0.191 0.146 0.196 
(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (1.503) (1.483) (1.958) (1.510) (1.159) (1.582) 
Labour competitiv. in  0.450*** 0.376*** 0.379*** 0.375*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 
origin (exporter) (ln (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)) (5.963) (4.663) (4.837) (5.063) (4.847) (5.279) 
Services price at destination  -0.392* -0.368* -0.476** -0.321 -0.248 -0.602*** 
(importer) (𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠) (-1.909) (-1.750) (-2.404) (-1.495) (-1.251) (-3.531) 
GVA Services at destination 0.683*** 0.680*** 0.708*** 0.677*** 0.672*** 0.706*** 
(importer) (ln (µsjt𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠)) (27.74) (27.16) (31.61) (26.76) (26.21) (29.03) 
Constant -1.650* -1.054 -1.098 -1.108 -1.139 -0.893 
 (-1.715) (-1.047) (-1.144) (-1.140) (-1.159) (-0.981) 
       
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,724 30,724 30,724 30,724 30,724 30,724 
R-squared 0.777 0.779 0.784 0.778 0.780 0.787 
       
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimations. Exporter-importer clustered standard errors.  
t-statistic in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
 
  
35 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has explored the extent to which institutional quality affects aggregate as well as 
sectoral bilateral trade across the majority of countries in the world. It has also delved into 
the question of whether the role of institutions for trade has been waxing or waning over 
the last two decades.  
The model used in the paper relies on the new trade theory model of multiple countries 
and sectors (Behrens and Ottaviano, 2009; Barbero et al., 2015), which allows us to derive a 
suitablesector specificgravity equation. This gravity equation is used to study how 
institutional conditions in levels for the importing country as well as the institutional 
distance between countries, affects bilateral trade. In particular, we assess the role of 
institutions for trade, controlling for geographical distance, cultural proximity, regional 
trade agreements, and accounting for model economic determinants related to labour cost 
competitiveness in origin (involving productivity and wages), trade costs, sectoral prices, 
and income shares at destination. All controls display the expected signs and significance at 
the aggregate and sectoral levels. 
The results of the analysis confirm the hypothesis that institutional quality influence trade, 
regardless of whether the institutional quality of the importing country or the institutional 
distance between the exporting and importing countries is considered. With the only 
exception of trade in services, all institutional variables included in the analysis are closely 
and positively connected to trade trends. Better institutional quality in the importing 
country eases bilateral trade and this result is reinforced when the institutional distance 
with the exporter increases in favour of the importing country. The results confirm the 
hypothesis that it is easier to trade with partners with better institutions.  
However, our results also point to the fact that the influence of institutional quality on 
bilateral trade is still a fraction of the capacity of other factors to affect exchanges between 
countries. While there is high variability in the effect of individual institutional indicators 
on the value of bilateral trade, their numerical coefficients tend to be systematically lower 
than those of more traditional trade factors, such as labour export competitiveness, price 
level at destination, and market share. The only exception is the agricultural sector, where 
institutions display the largest effect, showing the potential benefits of strengthening 
institutions in countries largely dependent on trade specialization in the primary sector, 
given their scarce factor endowments beyond natural resources. The extraction of natural 
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resources can be an important source of economic growth and social development. 
However, when poorly managed because of weak local institutional conditions, natural 
resource extraction has too often resulted in corruption and conflict. Our results indicate 
that better regulatory quality and government effectiveness in the management of agriculture and 
natural resource wealth can trigger an increase in much needed bilateral trade among 
developing countries. Finally, the ranking of institutional quality indicators is extremely 
robust, with regulatory quality exhibiting the highest effect on trade and voice and accountability, 
the lowest. In general, institutional quality fosters bilateral trade and, from a dynamic 
perspective, the effect of institutional quality on trade has waxed rather than waned with 
time.  
Overall, the results of the analysis are of particular relevance for developing economies.  
Their trade specialization in agricultural produce and raw materials, ultimately influenced by 
different economic factors (e.g. endowments, wages and relative productivities), is 
unavoidable in the first stages of economic development, but it can be compensated and 
re-adjusted in the short-run by institutional factors. Indeed, while geographical location 
(transport infrastructure) or factor endowments will undoubtedly continue to matter for 
trade, the margin of improvement in these areas is bound to be limited, particularly at a 
time when protectionism is finding a growing number of advocates among decision 
makers. The capacity of improvements in institutional quality in most emerging and 
developing countries to fuel greater trade remains, by contrast, still large. Hence, the 
chances of greater economic dynamism in a more integrated global economy will 
necessarily require better quality institutions and policies across most of the developing 
world as the path for greater prosperity.   
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